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Abstract
Since the early 1990’s, IT outsourcing has become a popular strategy with contracts valued at billions
of Euro, and durations ranging from five to ten years. Stories in the computing and business press
together with reports of analyses by consultants highlight that during the life-time of some contracts,
organisations have reconsidered their original decision to outsource. With this rethink, the options
available are to continue with the existing vendor and the existing contract, to re-negotiate some or all
of that contract with the existing vendor; to re-tender the contract or part of the contract and seek new
vendors; or to backsource, bringing some or all of the previously outsourced activities back in-house.
This last option has major implications for the organisation yet there is little empirical research on
this final part of the outsourcing process. This paper introduces backsourcing as a legitimate strategy
in the outsourcing process. An exploratory study identifies some recent examples where companies
have made the decision to backsource, surfacing the rationale behind those decisions. From an
analysis of the data, an end-to-end model for the outsourcing process is presented. The paper
concludes with an agenda for future research.
Keywords: IT outsourcing, strategy, outsourcing model, backsourcing
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INTRODUCTION

While organisations have outsourced Information Technology and Information Services almost since
the birth of information processing (Dibbern et al, 2004), the beginning of the current era of IT
outsourcing is usually linked to the decision by Eastman Kodak in 1989 to outsource its IT services
provision to a consortium led by IBM. A landmark paper by Loh and Venkatraman (1992) identified
that outsourcing decision as an acknowledgement that total IT outsourcing had now become a serious
strategic choice for companies. Since the Eastman Kodak decision, many other organisations have
outsourced their IT functions, and, as a result, the value of the IT outsourcing industry has grown
rapidly each year. The survey and analysis of the literature on Information Systems outsourcing by
Dibbern et al. (2004) quotes various estimates of the value of the IS outsourcing market including a
2003 study by International Data Corporation which, using a narrow definition of IS outsourcing,
estimated that actual global IS outsourcing spending was $40 billion in 1996 growing to $71 billion by
2003. Thus, both the scale of the IS outsourcing industry, and its growth rate are significant.
Lee et al (2003) described how issues relating to outsourcing have evolved over time, starting from the
‘make or buy’ decision, through the motivation for outsourcing; the scope of what was to be
outsourced; measurement of performance of the outsourcing vendor; whether to insource or outsource;
the increasing complexity of outsourcing contracts, and, most recently, a movement towards shared
risks and benefits in a partnership arrangement. In the context of these IT outsourcing trends we offer
evidence for another stage of evolution – the backsourcing of previously outsourced IT activities.
The practice of IT backsourcing has been fleetingly referred to number of times in the literature
without significant elaboration (Hirschheim and Lacity, 2000; Hirschheim, 1998). There is some
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evidence, particularly in the trade press and practitioner literature, to suggest that it is of sufficient
scale to warrant further attention (Bushell, 2003; Overby, 2003; Buxbaum, 2002). The objectives of
this exploratory study are to get an indication of the extent to which companies are backsourcing
previously outsourced IT contracts so as to understand some of their reasons, and to develop an
appropriate research agenda. The remainder of this paper is set out as follows: The next section
addresses a definitional problem of backsourcing related to the other main terms in the discourse
around outsourcing and insourcing. This is followed by a review of the literature identifying key
references to backsourcing that are already published and also highlighting the literature relevant to
issues in IT sourcing which may give rise to a decision to backsource. A number of instances of IT
backsourcing are then introduced and discussed. Based on an analysis of patterns evident in the data,
an end-to-end sourcing model is proposed which describes the sourcing process. We end with a
research agenda for IT backsourcing to clarify the issues raised.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

One of the challenges of discussing IT outsourcing is the lack of a common definition of the terms
used. Willcocks et al. (1995) point out that the terms information technology (IT) and information
systems (IS) are often used interchangeably, which can lead to confusion as to exactly what is being
outsourced. They define IT as “the technical means available – equipment and attendant techniques,
[which] is essentially activity-based, supply-oriented, and technology- and delivery-focused.” IS, on
the other hand, are “business applications, more or less IT-based.” For the purposes of this paper we
will consider that IT outsourcing includes both IT and IS.
Another issue is the inconsistent use of the terms ‘insourcing’ and ‘backsourcing’, particularly in the
popular press, where most of the up-to-date references for IT backsourcing are to be found. Lacity
and Hirschheim (1995, pg 1) define information systems outsourcing as “the use of a third party
vendor to provide information products and services that were previously provided internally”. Gilley
and Rasheed (2000) clarify this further by asserting that outsourcing “represents the fundamental
decision to reject the internalisation of an activity”. That decision, in turn, is based on the
organisation’s capability to perform that activity if it wished or decided to do so. So, according to
Gilley and Rasheed, a decision to outsource can only be made when “the internalisation of the good or
service outsourced is within the firm’s managerial and/or financial capabilities”. Thus, organisations
which have no choice but to acquire a service or an activity from an external supplier are not
outsourcing – they never had the option to internalise it in the first place, so they are simply engaging
in procurement. Hirschheim and Lacity (2000) define ‘insourcing’ in a similar way as “the practice of
evaluating the outsourcing option, but confirming the continued use of internal IT resources to achieve
the same objectives of outsourcing”.
Hirschheim (1998) and Kern and Willcocks (2001) define ‘backsourcing’ as “pulling back in-house
[previously outsourced] activities as outsourcing contracts expire or are terminated”. This definition
implies that there is an active decision to bring the activities back in-house, and that this decision is
made having considered other options such as extending, renewing, or renegotiating the existing
contract, or re-tendering to test the market and potentially find a new outsourcing vendor. Other
authors (e.g. Overby, 2003; Buxbaum, 2002; Tiernan, 2002) have used the terms ‘re-insourcing’ or
‘reinsourcing’ to describe this decision, or have made references to ‘insourcing’ in this context (e.g.
Samuels, 2005; Verhoef, 2005). To avoid confusion, we use the term ‘backsourcing’ as defined above
by Hirschheim, and by Kern and Willcocks.
The motivations of firms to outsource have been summarised by Mahnke as: Financial – reducing
costs, obtaining immediate cash, replacing capital outlays with periodic payments; Technical –
improving the quality of IT, gaining access to new and/or proprietary technology; Strategic – focus on
core activities, facilitate merger and acquisition, access to new and/or proprietary technology,
attracting skilled professionals; and, Political – dissatisfaction with internal IT department, regarding
IT as a support function, pressure from vendors, or desire to follow trends or imitate.
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Frameworks to assist outsourcing decision-making have been described by Clark et al. (1995) and
Cronk and Sharp (1995), and a number of authors (e.g. Dibbern et al, 2004; Kern et al, 2002; Gilley
& Rasheed, 2000; Earl, 1996; Clark et al. 1995; and Jurison, 1995) identify the benefits and risks of
IT outsourcing. In particular, Jurison (1995) compiled a list of benefits from a wide variety of
publications, and concluded that economic considerations, in one form or another, have the primary
role in IT outsourcing decisions. The expected benefits of outsourcing identified by Jurison are: cost
savings through economies of scale; cash infusion; faster applications development; improved service
and quality; access to IT expertise and competence; access to new technologies; flexibility in
managing IT resources; and elimination of a troublesome function. Gilley and Rasheed (2000) add
some other benefits to this list: avoiding lock-in to a specific type of technology by having an ability to
switch outsourcing suppliers as new, more cost-effective technologies become available; and, an
increased focus on the organisation’s core competencies.
In practice, in a number of cases, these benefits have not always been achieved with a resulting effect
on costs, performance and service levels. For example, Boonlert (2005) has observed that outsourcing
does not always lead to competitive advantages and cost savings, and argues that the chances of
success in outsourcing are at best 50:50. In their summary of the track record of IT outsourcing, one
of the issues identified by Kern & Willcocks (2001, pg 5) is a number of organisations encountering
‘severe/difficult’ problems as a consequence of outsourcing IT. These are: Strategic (e.g. supplier
does not understand our business, corporate strategy and IT are no longer aligned); Cost (e.g.
escalation due to loopholes); Managerial (poor supplier staffing, managerial skills shortage, in-house
staff resistance); Operational (defining service levels, lack of supplier responsiveness, getting
suppliers to work together); Contractual / Legal (e.g. contract too loose, inadequate service level
agreements); and, Technical (e.g. suppliers’ IT skills shortage, failure to upgrade IT). Mahnke et al.
(2005) point out that while most IT outsourcing decisions are made based on economic and/or
strategic analysis, they at times fail due to relational factors.
The 2005 Global IT Outsourcing Study on buyers and providers of IT outsourcing services by
DiamondCluster1, a Chicago-based management consulting firm, has found that the number of buyers
that have abnormally terminated an outsourcing relationship in the past twelve months has more than
doubled to 51% in 2004 versus 21% in the previous year. In support of this, a recent study by Deloitte
Consulting (Landis et al 2005) on current outsourcing strategies, their impact on organisational
performance, and nascent outsourcing trends has identified a number of issues. In particular, the
rationale for outsourcing has not fared well with the experience of outsourcing – for example:
70% of firms mentioned cost savings as a major driver of their outsourcing decision, yet 37%
paid additional / hidden costs for services they believed were included in their contracts
57% of firms expected to gain access to best practices / quality / innovation, yet 31% of those
participants stated that vendors became complacent once contracts were in place
35% of firms expected increased flexibility / capacity / scalability, yet one of the findings of
the study was that outsourcing adds a level of rigidity because contracts are binding
35% of firms expected a greater focus on core / strategic activities, yet 25% of those
participants has mislabelled functions as non-strategic and ultimately backsourced those areas
Similarly, 74% of a sample of fifty ‘problem deals’ in the Deloitte study failed due to vendor underperformance and/or cost overruns, and 64% of firms in the study backsourced services. Earl (1996)
discusses the risks of IT outsourcing and points out that even though none of the risks associated with
IT outsourcing were esoteric or unusual, the uncertainties and complexities involved are such that he
suggests rephrasing the IT sourcing question to ‘why should we not insource IT services’?

1
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So, while there are many papers about different aspects of outsourcing and, in particular, about the
motivations, risks, and benefits of outsourcing, together with frameworks to assist decision-making,
there are also many reports of general dissatisfaction with the experience of IT outsourcing and that
those expected benefits are not being achieved. While Willcocks and Lacity (2000) have described
how the results of outsourcing are improving with greater experience of outsourcing, there is also
some evidence that the level of dissatisfaction is still growing. In a search of LexisNexis for the
period from 1999 through 2004, Landis et al. found a fourfold increase in the instances of sentiment
against outsourcing in the final year of the study – 2004. Vendor under-performance is the key driver
of outsourcing problems and 42% of the problem deals are related to IT infrastructure.
However, there is a gap in the literature as to what happens when organisations experience such
difficulties with their IT outsourcing. While, the evidence would suggest that the majority of
outsourcing deals are less than satisfactory, most companies try to work things out with their service
providers rather than backsource (Overby, 2005). Still, it is clear from references in trade and
practitioner journals and company news and that IT backsourcing is a real and current issue. Among
the small number of academic references is Hirschheim (1998) who identified backsourcing as an
emerging trend, and pointed out that companies were not achieving the flexibility and service levels
that they had expected. Later, Hirschheim and Lacity (2000) used a backsourcing scenario as one of
their archetype case studies to show how the senior IT managers achieved lower IT costs and
improved service levels by terminating outsourcing contracts and rebuilding the internal IT
organisation. In their IT outsourcing literature survey and analysis, Dibbern et al. (2004) suggest that
backsourcing may become one of a number of key trends in outsourcing. Cullen et al. (2005) view
outsourcing as a strategy with a life cycle rather than as a one-off transaction. From this viewpoint,
backsourcing is one alternative to be considered in the final building block of the outsourcing life
cycle model in which the final building block is ‘refresh – towards the next generation’.
In contrast to the peer-reviewed literature, some practitioner magazines have had relatively extensive
discussions about backsourcing. For example, Overby (2005) describes the ‘whiplash’ effect on
JPMorgan Chase employees who were first transferred to IBM as part of an outsourcing deal, then
subsequently backsourced when the contract was cancelled. Whiplash includes such issues as
uncertainty about continued employment, diminished morale, decreased productivity, and loss of
employee trust. The article further describes the cost in management time, attention, and productivity
as the contract was outsourced and then backsourced, as well as the pent-up demand of IT projects
stalled by the rigidity of the outsourcing contract. Samuels (2005) quotes the head of Deloitte’s
strategy practice who says that the high level of backsourcing can be partly attributed to poor
management decisions with managers rushing headlong into long-term outsourcing contracts. One
outcome of this is that over 80% of IT outsourcing contracts are renegotiated at some point during
their lifespan. A study by the Performance Management and Benchmarking Practice of XMG2, a
leading global ICT research and advisory firm shows that almost 90 per cent of contract renegotiations
in the Asia-Pacific region are at least considering either backsourcing, or select sourcing. The study
points out that, until about early 2003, the subjects of backsourcing or select sourcing were almost
unknown in the Asia-Pacific region. The XMG study identifies that this trend has been driven by
dissatisfaction with service quality, problematical change processes, and lack of integration.
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DATA COLLECTION

In order to explore this issue of backsourcing, stories published in the news media about backsourcing
decisions were accessed via the online news service Factiva. We also searched for relevant articles in
trade journals and magazines such as Computer Weekly, CIO Magazine, Outsourcing Journal, and
2

XMG (2005) http://itmatters.com.ph/news/news_06272005a.htm. (accessed 13th July 2005)

4

Computer World. Instances of backsourcing identified from these sources were followed up by
research in the ‘Investor Relations’ and ‘Newsroom’ sections on relevant company websites. SEC
filings were also examined. While these sources are typically more subjective than peer-reviewed
journals, they are however, independently compiled and a useful barometer of contemporary practice,
and they report up-to-date information on what is actually happening in the marketplace. A summary
of some of the more recent backsourcing decisions resulting from this search is shown in Table 1.

Client

Vendor

Scale & Scope of Contract

Start / End dates

Comment

JPMorgan
Chase

IBM

7 year, $5 billion contract covering
data centres, help desks, distributed
computing, data and voice networks,
and 4,000 staff and contractors.

Signed in December 2002.
Terminated in 15 Sept
2004 – after 21 months in
operation.

After the merger between JP
Morgan Chase and Bank One, the
new entity wishes to manage its
own infrastructure

Sainsburys

Accenture

7 year, £Stg 1.7 billion contract
covering design, building
implementing and running all the
retailers’ IT systems and networks.
Subsequently extended by 3 years in
2003 to end in 2010.

Contract signed on 1 Nov
2002 and terminated on
27th October 2005 – after
2 years.

IT and supply chain systems
valued at £Stg 260 million were
written off in the 2004 accounts
with further expected material
impact on 2005 results

Cable &
Wireless

IBM

10-year contract, £Stg 1.8 billion
covering all aspects of C&W’s IT
infrastructure except IT strategy and
systems security

Signed in 1998, terminated
in June 2003 – after 4.7
years.

Alleged overcharging by IBM.
Legal action settled in Sept ’03,
terms not disclosed

Sears
Roebuck
(SR)

Computer
Sciences
Corp (CSC)

10 year, $1.6 billion covering servers,
desktop PCs, systems that support
Sears’ websites, voice & data
networks, and decision-support
technology. Sears retained
mainframes and core retail systems.

Signed in June 2004 and
terminated with effect from
11 May 2005 – after less
than a year.

SR alleges that CSC failed to live
up to the agreement

Halifax Bank
of Scotland
(HBOS)

IBM

10-year, £700 million contract
covering the provision of IT
operational services

Signed on 29 June 2000
and terminated on 29 Aug
2002 – after 2.2 years.

Business requirements changed
after a merger.

Gateway
Computer
Corp.

Affiliated
Computer
Services

7 year, $400 million contract for
midrange, desktop, helpdesk, field
services, network mgmt, application
development, and maintenance

Signed in Sept 2003 and
terminated on 17 May
2004 – after less than a
year

Business changes, restructuring
and staff reductions reduced the
need for an outsourcing vendor.

Bedfordshire
County
Council (UK)

Hyder
Business
Services
(HBS)

£Stg 267 million for provision and
maintenance of a range of IT services
including: IT, call centres,
communications, HR, finance,
education, business support 547 staff
transferring to BCC from HBS.

12-year contract signed in
2001. Terminated in Sept
2005 – after 5.5 years.

BCC alleges contractor default

Oxford
Health Plans,
USA

Computer
Sciences
Corporation
(CSC)

5-year, $195 million contract for helpdesk services, desktop systems, and
network operations.

Signed on 1 Nov 2000,
terminated on 10 May
2002 – after 1.5 years.

OHP wished to regain control of
the IS function

West
Berkshire
County
Council

Amey, UK

10-year, £Stg 168 million contract to
provide a range of services including
property, planning, HR, information
& communication technology, legal,
and administration

Signed on 6th June 2002,
terminated on 22nd June
2005 – after 3 years.

Terminated by the contractor as
they had been unable to grow
other public services business to a
sufficient level and could not
realise the anticipated
efficiencies.

Table 1.

CSC alleges that SR terminated
the agreement ‘for convenience’
as a result of its merger with
KMart

HBS states that BCC accepts that
HBS was never in breach of
contract

A summary of some recent IT backsourcing decisions

Collected data were inserted into a research database. Inconsistencies were reconciled by triangulation
through examining multiple sources of evidence. Company press releases frequently give a favourable
‘spin’ to the company’s decision that was often at odds with the vendor’s version, and vice versa. In
these situations, commentator analysis in reported news stories was used to adjudicate, although the
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arguments of both sides were recorded in the database. The collected data were analysed using
content analysis and coded accordingly.
It is recognised that this method of data collection only identified those situations that made it into the
public domain. It is possible that many other organisations, on reaching the end of their IT outsourcing
contract, made the decision to backsource quietly and without the need to produce a press release or
note it in their annual report, and so were not found in this process.
All the outsourcing contracts quoted in Table 1, relative to the scale of the originating organisations,
can be considered as significant commitments of money, time, opportunity cost, and other resources
on the part of the client company, and also for the outsourcing vendor In each case, the later decision
to backsource, for whatever reason, indicates at least a decision of similar scale.
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FINDINGS

Evidence provided by the data indicates that backsourcing is clearly a legitimate sourcing option either
at the end of a contract or during the lifetime of a contract. While there is evidence of increasing
dissatisfaction with the IT outsourcing experience, from the data it is impossible to say whether, as a
practice, backsourcing is more prevalent today than it was ten years ago. The data were analysed to
ascertain the reason the decision to backsource was made. Often it was difficult to characterise the
real reasons why a particular contract was terminated. There may be a dispute between the parties, or
reluctance to discuss in public the true factors leading to the decision, or legal action may be pending
which will stifle statements by the opposing parties.
Problems arise during the Contract / Failure to achieve specific Objectives
Problems arising in the contract, or failure to achieve key business objectives can be a factor. These
problems can quickly lead to accusations, counter-accusations, and a legal dispute. For example,
Cable & Wireless signed an outsourcing contract with IBM in December 2000 for the bulk of its
critical management systems including customer care and billing. After a relatively short period, in
February 2002, both parties engaged a consultant to review the benchmarking provisions in the
agreement. Based on the outcome of that review, Cable & Wireless (C&W) initiated legal action in
June 2003 against IBM for alleged overcharging. IBM disputed the allegation and stated that it would
‘contest the case vigorously’.3 The outsourcing contract, which had been agreed in December 2000,
was cancelled on 30 June 2003, just under half-way through its ten-year term. In September 2003 the
legal action was settled and, in an agreed statement, both companies said that C&W would now take
the outsourcing contract back in-house as a result of “business changes” within C&W. Settlement
terms were confidential.
Bedfordshire County Council paid £7.7 million to terminate its 12 year £267 million contract with
Hyder Business Systems (HBS) following problems with a SAP implementation which prevented the
Council from filing its accounts for 2003/04 before its regulator’s deadline.4
Each party cited
contradictory reasons for the termination with the Council alleging ‘contractor defaults’ and HBS
stating that ‘Bedfordshire accepted that HBS was never in breach of contract.’ Rather then become
embroiled in legal action, both sides settled on 14 August 2005.
Sainsburys terminated a ten year £1.7 billion outsourcing contract with Accenture signed just two
years previously and backsourced its IT activities after a failure to modernise its supply chain had a
significant business impact.5 This failure led to a £260 million charge against earnings in 2004 when
3

‘Cable & Wireless: Lawsuit against IBM alleges overcharging for Tech Services’. The Wall Street Journal, 23 June 2003.
‘Bedfordshire pays HBS £7.7m to terminate outsourcing contract’, Computer Weekly, 13 September 2005.
5
Separate Press Releases by Accenture, and by Sainsbury’s, 27th October, 2005, and an article in Information Week - ‘U.K.
grocery chain terminates big outsourcing deal with Accenture’, 28 October 2005.
4
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it was forced to write off a number of IT systems that did not work as planned. In this case, both
parties issued effectively identical press releases on the termination of the contract and neither side
initiated legal action.
IT now seen as strategic – A Desire to regain Control
From the data, this arises in two main ways: with a realisation that the previous decision to outsource
was based on the assumption that IT was a commodity whereas it is now realised to be core to
business strategy; or, as a result of a merger where significant new or enhanced skills and capabilities
are now available to the new entity.
For example, in April 2004, health care company Oxford Health Plans (OHP) terminated its five-year,
$195 million outsourcing agreement with Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) just 18 months into
its five-year $US195 million contract as it wished to regain control of its IS function. CSC had been
contracted to take responsibility for a variety of OHPs information systems, including its data centre
operations, help desk, desktop systems and network management, with Oxford retaining many of the
IS functions it viewed as important to its core businesses, including application development and
maintenance, database administration, quality assurance, programme management and architecture.
In a statement announcing the termination, president and COO of OHP Charles Berg said they
believed that fully integrating the entire function would allow the company to deploy technology
solutions in a more flexible, timely and cost-effective manner to meet its business goals.
Based in Seattle, Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a provider of financial services to consumers and
small businesses across the USA. IBM Global Services had been awarded a ten-year, $533 million
outsourcing contract in 1996 to provide desktop support, network services, help desk, network
management, architecture, and strategy for the company. In 2001, the newly-appointed Chief
Information Officer identified that the outsourcing arrangement was negatively affecting operational
excellence and customer service and decided to backsource the activities into the WaMu information
technology group citing the reason that “the functions involve such close interactions with customers.”
The large Australian bank and insurer Suncorp undertook one of the biggest IT backsourcing projects
in Australian corporate history after it acquired GIO Australia from AMP for $Aus 1.4 billion in mid2001. GIO’s infrastructure had been outsourced to Computer Sciences Corp. Suncorp decided to
bring the IT operations of the newly acquired GIO back in-house as they both ran very similar
platforms through mainframe, midrange and desktop and they saw the opportunity to get benefits from
economies of scale. In the process they claim to have saved $Aus 120 million and created 80 jobs.
Their reason for backsourcing was that the company believes that doing the bulk of its IT in-house is
the best way to maintain its competitive edge. Suncorp Group Executive, IT Carmel Gray says that “IT
is really integral to the quality of service customers receive from us and every interaction they have
with us. It is very difficult to tell where technology ends and products and services begin these days,
so our preference is to manage IT in-house on the basis that we can run it at least as well as or better
than the best outsourcer” (Bushell, 2003).
Restructuring due to merger and acquisition activities can also lead to the reconsideration of the
continued usefulness of an IT outsourcing deal when the entity resulting from the merger or
acquisition has significantly greater economies of scale or IT skills. Following its merger with Bank
One, JPMorgan Chase backsourced a $5 billion contract with IBM. 6 The reasons given by the CIO
of JPMorgan Chase for this decision were that the merger created a new firm with significantly greater
capacity to manage its own technology and infrastructure and had the significant scale, enhanced
capabilities, tools and processes to build its own global infrastructure services organization. They
believe that “managing their own technology infrastructure is best for the long-term growth and
success of their company and shareholders and would give them competitive advantages, accelerate
6

JPMorgan Chase Press Release 15th September, 2004
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innovation, and enable them to become more streamlined and efficient.” JP Morgan has determined
that, with its Bank One merger, it now has “sufficient scale to do its own IT, as well as to justify a
belief that IT can serve as a core competency from which it can derive a competitive advantage.”
Similarly, after its merger with Halifax Building Society in 2001 to form Halifax Bank of Scotland
(HBOS), Bank of Scotland decided to terminate its ten-year £700 million outsourcing arrangement
with IBM. When the contract was signed in June 2000 it was seen as one of Europe’s biggest
outsourcing deals. The decision to terminate the contract cost HBOS tens of millions of pounds both
in transition costs to backsource the activities and for penalties to IBM for terminating the contract
early without sufficient cause7. HBOS also faced significant hurdles in rebuilding the management
team and enticing the staff who had transferred to IBM to return to HBOS.
Changes in the Business Environment, Business Change and Evolution
The business environment changes continually. Many of the early outsourcing contracts were
negotiated in the early 1990s when the economic climate was depressed. The upturn in business in the
late 1990s obviated the need for those cost savings-oriented outsourcing deals. Extension into new
product areas or new markets, or the reverse – contraction due to poor business performance can lead
to a decision to outsource functions, or to cut back on existing outsourcing contracts when the need is
no longer evident. For example, after they changed their CEO, contracted their operations by closing
188 retail outlets which eliminated about 2,500 positions, and bought eMachines Inc. to reposition
their brands, Gateway, Inc. then backsourced a seven year $400 million services contract which it had
signed with Affiliated Computer Services just seven months before.
Technology Change
The rapid and widespread adoption of internet-related technologies during the mid- to late 1990s is an
example of a sea change that can take place in the technologies used by organisations. Technology
change and the associated dramatic reductions in cost and improvements in performance washed out
the cost advantages of those early IT outsourcing contracts. Overby (2005) quotes a JPMorgan
systems engineer who had survived the outsourcing, and then backsourcing at Bank One, who said
that “once they signed the [outsourcing] contract we didn’t move at all beyond that date as far as
picking up new technologies that would give us competitive advantage. Technology was not
refreshed, and new projects were not rolled out.”
Management Change
A new management team, or individual changes, particularly at CEO or CIO level have also led to a
decision to reconsider the value being obtained from the IT outsourcing contract.
Some new
management teams have reconsidered the contribution of information technology in a strategic context
– that which was previously considered commodity may, on reflection, be considered a core function.
The attitudes and preferences of the new management team were clearly a factor in the decision by the
newly-merged JPMorgan Chase / Bank One entity to backsource. The newly-appointed CIO of the
merged entity had previously been CIO of Bank One and had backsourced their operations from IBM
Global Services and AT&T in 2002.
Other Reasons
Sears Roebuck ended a $1.6 billion technology services contract with Computer Sciences Corp. (CSC)
with effect from May 11, 2005 “for cause due to CSC's failure to perform certain of its obligations in
accordance with the terms of the Agreement.”8 The ten-year contract was agreed in June 2004, under
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Computer Weekly 29th August 2002,
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2002/08/29/189257/Bankbins%c2%a3700mIBMdeal.htm (Accessed 19th October
2005)
8
Public filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission by Sears Holdings Corp. on 11th May 2005.
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which CSC would provide IT infrastructure support services, including desktops, servers, systems to
support Sears-related Web sites, voice and data networks and decision-support technology. While
Sears Roebuck alleges that Computer Sciences Corp failed to live up to their agreement, CSC, on the
other hand, alleges that Sears terminated the agreement “for convenience due to change in control” as
a result of its merger with Kmart Holding Corp.
First Consulting Group, Inc, also signed a seven-year outsourcing agreement in November 1999 with
The New York and Presbyterian Hospital (NYP), New York, USA. In July 2005 NYP exercised its
option to terminate the outsourcing agreement “for convenience” effective 31 December 2005, one
year before the end of the contract 9.
In June 2005, Amey, UK terminated a ten year £168 million outsourcing agreement with its client,
West Berkshire County Council after just three years because of its inability to grow other public
sector business to a sufficient level. This is a refreshing contrast to expectations of poor performance
which would arise from the Winner’s Curse (Kern et al, 2002). Apparently, in this case, when Amey
realised that it would be unable to grow its other public sector business to a sufficiently profitable
level, it initiated a discussion which ended with both sides reaching an amicable and sensible
arrangement to terminate the contract. Tony Barry, group director, strategic development for Amey
said10: “Amey has made a major contribution to the development of council services. It has become
clear, however, that the original objectives for the partnership, set by both the council and Amey,
cannot easily be realised. The settlement is therefore in our collective best interests."
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DISCUSSION AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The decision to outsource is usually made in the context of corporate strategy. A number of authors
have discussed the strategic aspects of IT outsourcing (Quélin and Duhamel, 2003; Roy and Aubert,
2002; DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998; Willcocks et al, 1995; and Quinn and Hilmer, 1994). Several
authors have written about frameworks for helping to make an IT outsourcing decision (deLooff,
1995; Cronk & Sharp, 1995), and Cullen et al (2005) have described a detailed process for client
organisations to follow when considering an outsourcing contract to improve their likelihood of
success while minimising their risk. However, despite extensive literature on the risks of outsourcing
and on frameworks for decision-making related to IT outsourcing, evidently it still goes wrong. We
outline below what we believe would be areas for fruitful research.
After the contract is awarded to the successful vendor or multiple vendors, and after an initial
transition period, the client begins to experience the services and deliverables of the outsourcing
contract. The contract may proceed normally and reach the end of its term uneventfully. However,
the Deloitte study has found that while 30% of companies have encountered ‘normal growing pains’
with the outsourcing contract, 70% have had ‘significant negative experiences’, and so, problems
emerge with the contract. One could speculate that a potential driver of problems in the contract is the
so-called ‘winner’s curse’ (Kern et al, 2002), in which vendors make unrealistically low bids to win
the contract, then try to recover using practices such as identifying areas in need of urgent attention,
but which are not included explicitly in the contract – so earning extra fees. This, and other similar
practices where a vendor focuses disproportionately on recovering costs, are likely to lead to trade-offs
in performance or quality which are unfavourable to the client’s expectations from the contract.
The outsourcing contract may proceed normally and uneventfully towards its natural end.
Alternatively, several types of change can occur during the contract: A change in the management
9

First Consulting Group Press Release, 18th July 2005. URL http://investor.fcg.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61499&p=irol-news
(Accessed 19th October 2005)
10
‘West Berkshire Council and Amey end partnership.’ Local Government Chronicle, 22 June 2005. Accessed on Factiva
20 November 2005.
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team, or changes in key individuals, or business change and evolution – either extension into new
product areas or new markets, or the reverse – contraction due to poor business performance, can lead
to a decision to re-evaluate the original decision to outsource. Technology and business-related
innovations will also continue to evolve during the lifetime of the contract and may also trigger a reevaluation of the outsourcing contract. At that point, the main options for this decision are:
1. To renew, extend, or renegotiate some or all of the IT outsourcing contract with the original
outsourcing vendor for better terms in the light of experience and expected new needs;
2. To re-tender some or all of the IT outsourcing contract to the market to establish whether a
different vendor can meet the needs of the organisation better;
3. To backsource some or all of the previously outsourced activities and carry them out in-house.
The model in Figure 1 is based on patterns observed in the data and illustrates a summary of the issues
leading towards the re-evaluation of the outsourcing decision, and the main options available at that
point.
Problems with
the Contract

Decision
to outsource

End of Contract

Renew, Extend, or
Renegotiate some or all of
the existing contact
Re-evaluation
of
outsourcing
decision

Change

Time & Progress with the contract
Figure 1.

Backsource some or all of the
activities
Re-tender to the market to
find a new Vendor for some
or all of the activities

An end-to-end model of issues and options for evaluating the outsourcing decision

Clearly, a good or poor experience with the vendors in the just-terminated contract will, to a large
extent, determine the choice made. In the case of the first two of these options, firms opening or reopening discussions with outsourcing vendors will start negotiations from a different starting point in
the light of their learning and experience from their soon-to-be-terminated outsourcing contract. New
requirements may be included at this stage, as well as the opportunity to include technology changes
and other environmental changes since the last contract was negotiated. Also, in the case of the first
two options, some firms may considering the formation of true alliances / partnerships involving the
formation of new entities with synergistic skills aimed at specific markets, or equity holding deals with
vendors and clients taking shareholdings in the other company (Dibbern et al, 2004).
The third option – backsourcing is the focus of this paper. We have used secondary research to get an
indication as to the scale of IT backsourcing. We will continue with this research and also collect
primary data to build a more comprehensive picture of the contemporary issue of backsourcing – in
particular the motivations for, and implications of a decision to backsource, together with guidance as
to the processes around backsourcing.
The motivation for backsourcing is just as relevant a topic as the motivation for outsourcing. To take
just one example, it is interesting to note that, comparing quotes from the Vice Chairman of JPMorgan
Chase in a company press release when the outsourcing contract was awarded to IBM in Dec 2002,
with another quote by the CIO of the newly merged Chase / Bank One in another press release at the
time of the backsourcing announcement in Sept 2004, Overby (2005) suggests that the reasons for
backsourcing were basically the same reasons that were asserted for outsourcing in the first place. In
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both cases technology was seen as key to competitive advantage, and the just-announced arrangement
(whether outsourcing or backsourcing) would enable innovation and efficiency.
In our (albeit relatively small) sample of organisations that have backsourced it is interesting to note
that, while saving cost has often been quoted as a main reason for outsourcing, a failure to achieve
such cost savings, so far as we can ascertain from published statements, is not a main reason for
backsourcing. While cost savings are clearly part of the decision, it appears that the main reasons for
backsourcing in this sample have more to do with a desire to regain control and flexibility, a new
recognition of the role of information systems, or strategy change following a change of management.
Another revealing point is that all of the companies listed in Figure 1 appear to have totally
bacsourced, that is, none of them backsourced selectively.
A number of large datasets have been quoted in the literature over the years (e.g. Lacity and
Willcocks, 2000; Lacity and Willcocks, 1998) to establish some of the main issues in outsourcing
practices – why outsource, what outsourcing option to use, and for which IT activities, among other
questions. Recent research has focused on implementation issues such as how to outsource and on an
evaluation of the outcomes of outsourcing. Although many of the organisations that were used in
those analyses are anonymous, one interesting area for further research would be for the authors to reexamine their datasets and follow up to identify those organisations which have backsourced so as to
build a picture as to their motivations, decision-making process and experiences.
What is remarkable about our data is the number of examples where the outsourcing contract was
terminated within one or two years of signing the contract, in particular given the extensive analysis
and negotiations that presumably took place beforehand, and the cost, possible penalties, legal action,
management resources and complexity involved in re-absorbing or hiring staff, and re-integrating with
business areas. With these potential problems and penalties raised by a decision to backsource, is it
more desirable for some organisations to renegotiate an outsourcing contract with the existing vendor
rather than go through the trauma and further disruption of backsourcing their IT function, or to begin
the process of establishing a new outsourcing relationship with a new vendor? If so, this would be
evidence of effective lock-in by a client to a vendor, an issue which has been identified as one of the
risks of outsourcing but for which there does not appear to be any empirical evidence. Another area for
research would be in regard to the decision-making process. Was the backsourcing the result of a
flawed decision – that is, was the decision to outsource a good decision in the first place? Or, was
backsourcing the result of a flawed process – the decision was correct, but was poorly implemented by
the firm, or was the result of poor performance by the vendor? Or, was the decision to outsource
correct at the time, but important aspects of the business and its environment changed, or technology
developments obviated the need to outsource in the first place. Finally, questions around effective
backsourcing and how best to re-integrate while maintaining / restoring IT value merit some research.

6

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have shown a number of instances to indicate that backsourcing is significant in
scale. Its implications are also significant, either when it is being implemented, with the attendant
issues of acquiring, rebuilding and re-integrating knowledge, resources, and capabilities back in-house
or, perhaps more significantly, when managers decide not to backsource because it would be so
disruptive to business and to the organisation, and too difficult to achieve. We have identified areas
where we believe further research would usefully elaborate on these issues.
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